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Abstract 
This paper explores the contrast between mentalistic and behaviouristic 
interpretations of decision theory. The former regards credences and utilities as 
psychologically real, while the latter regards them as mere representations of an 
agent’s preferences. Philosophers typically adopt the former interpretation, 
economists the latter. It is argued that the mentalistic interpretation is preferable if 
our aim is to use decision theory for descriptive purposes, but if our aim is 
normative then the behaviouristic interpretation cannot be dispensed with. 
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1. INTRODCUTION 
Modern decision theory is a cross-disciplinary enterprise, spanning economics, 
statistics, philosophy and psychology. This is reflected in the recent history of the 
subject; key contributors in the 20th century include the philosopher Frank Ramsey 
(1931), the mathematician/economist pair John von Neumann and Oskar 
Morgenstern (1944), and the statistician Leonard Savage (1954). Despite this fact, 
the standard interpretation of decision theory appears to differ widely across these 
disciplines. In particular, there is a striking mismatch between how economists and 
philosophers typically understand decision theory, which has impeded 
communication between them. The aim of this paper is to discuss this mismatch, 
diagnose its roots, and offer a tentative adjudication. 
 My focus will be mostly on expected utility (EU) theory, in both its 
‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ versions. EU is the classical theory of decision under 
risk / uncertainty, and typically the only one discussed in the philosophical 
literature. Indeed many philosophers appear to use ‘decision theory’ simply to 
mean EU theory. From the economist’s point of view this may seem odd, given the 
numerous alternatives to EU developed in the economics literature of the last thirty 
years
1
, but its explanation lies in the fact that philosophers are usually interested in 
decision theory construed normatively rather than descriptively, i.e. as a theory of 
ideally rational, rather than actual, choice. Economists by contrast are typically 
interested in the descriptive construal; the point of developing non-EU theories is 
precisely to account for observed behaviour.       
 The normative / descriptive dichotomy will be discussed below; but it is the 
dichotomy between behaviouristic and mentalistic interpretations of decision 
theory that will occupy centre stage.
2
 The former regards preferences or choices as 
primary and utilities and credences as derivative; maximization of expected utility 
is a strictly ‘as if’ story, on this view. The mentalistic view, by contrast, treats an 
agent’s utility function and credence function as psychologically real, and capable 
of causing / explaining their preferences and choices. Economists typically endorse 
                                                          
1
 For reviews of this work at different stages of its development see Machina (1987), Starmer 
(2000) or Wakker (2010). 
2
 The contrast between these two interpretations of decision theory has been discussed many times, 
under various labels; see in particular Hansson (1988), Bermudez (2009) and Buchak (2013).  
Dietrich and List (forthcoming) study the mentalist / behaviourist opposition (under those labels) in 
relation to microeconomics more generally. 
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the behaviouristic view, and often explicitly reject the mentalistic view as wrong-
headed; but among philosophers the mentalistic view is widespread. Indeed many 
philosophers who discuss decision theory simply assume the mentalistic 
interpretation without argument; while others explicitly argue against the reigning 
behaviouristic orthodoxy of the economists.  
 This situation prompts an important question. Given that behaviourism as a 
general view of the mind is widely discredited among philosophers and 
psychologists, does this speak against the behaviouristic interpretation of decision 
theory and in favour of the mentalistic? The answer to this question, I will argue, is 
‘it depends’. In particular, it depends on whether one wishes to use decision theory 
for normative or descriptive purposes. So there is an interesting interaction 
between the normative / descriptive issue and the behaviouristic / mentalistic issue. 
I argue below that standard anti-behaviourist considerations do gain traction if one 
wishes to use decision theory for descriptive purposes; but for normative purposes 
matters are rather different. 
 The structure of this paper is as follows.  Section 2 is a brief outline of the 
origins of modern decision theory, the point of which will become clear. Section 3 
discusses the contrast between behaviourist and mentalistic interpretations. Section 
4 contrasts normative and descriptive uses of decision theory. Sections 5 and 6 ask 
how the behaviouristic / mentalistic distinction relates to the descriptive / 
normative distinction. Section 7 is a critique of other philosophers’ views on the 
foundations of decision theory. Section 8 concludes. 
 
2. THE ORIGINS OF EXPECTED UTILITY THEORY  
The origins of EU theory lie in Daniel Bernoulli’s attempt to explain the 
observation that in games of chance, people typically do not maximize expected 
monetary value (Bernoulli 1738). This observation, made dramatic by the ‘St. 
Petersburg paradox’, today enjoys the status of a well-confirmed empirical fact. 
For example, agents typically prefer £5 for sure to a gamble which pays either £10 
or nothing depending on the flip of a fair coin, despite both options having the 
same expected monetary value. Bernoulli argued that people’s choices instead 
maximize expected utility, and suggested that an agent’s utility function is the 
logarithm of money. 
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Two points about Bernoulli’s theory deserve note. First, Bernoulli offered 
no argument for why a person should try to maximize their expected utility (nor for 
why their utility function should be logarithmic). Had he been asked to explain 
why an agent should not care about the variance in utility of a gamble, as well as 
its expected utility, for example, he would have had no answer. In so far as 
Bernoulli’s aim was simply to describe or explain agents’ actual choices, his 
inability to answer this question may not matter. But if the principle of expected 
utility maximization is construed as normative then the question cannot be ducked. 
Second, Bernoulli understood ‘utility’ in a mentalistic way, i.e. as a 
measure of how much happiness an agent gets from a given amount of money. 
This raises an immediate question. How do we know that happiness or satisfaction 
can be quantified at all, and in particular why think it should be measurable on a 
cardinal scale, as it must if the idea of expected utility maximization is to make 
sense?
 
Bernoulli offered no answer to this question. 
Modern decision theory borrowed the idea of EU maximization from 
Bernoulli but developed it in a different way, and in the process supplied answers, 
of a sort, to the two questions above. The key idea, common to the treatments of 
Ramsey, Savage and von Neumann & Morgenstern, is to deduce EU maximization 
from a more fundamental basis. Their starting point is an agent’s preference 
relation between certain options, which can in principle be discovered by 
observation. This preference relation is assumed to satisfy certain axioms that are 
meant to be requirements of rationality. It is then shown, via a representation 
theorem, that an agent whose preferences satisfy the axioms necessarily behaves as 
if they are an EU maximizer, and vice-versa. Thus the EU principle does not have 
to be taken as a primitive, but can be deduced from something supposedly more 
basic. Though this style of argument will be familiar to many readers, it is worth 
spelling out in more detail. 
 
2.1 von Neumann & Morgenstern’s theory 
In von Neumann & Morgenstern’s theory, an agent is faced with a choice between 
lotteries, where a lottery is an objective probability distribution over a finite set O 
of outcomes, or prizes. Thus for example, O might be a set of holiday destinations, 
e.g.{France, Spain, Italy}. The prizes are strict alternatives, i.e. only one will 
occur. A lottery specifies the probability (i.e. objective chance) that each member 
5 
 
of O has of occurring; thus for example (France, 1/3; Spain 1/3, Italy 1/3) is the 
lottery in which each of the three holiday destinations occurs with equal 
probability. An outcome may be identified with the degenerate lottery in which it 
receives probability 1. The set of all lotteries over O is denoted L. 
 The agent is assumed to have a (weak) preference relation R over the 
lottery set L; ‘xRy’ means that the agent weakly prefers lottery x to y, where x, y  
L. This is often interpreted to mean that the agent would never choose y over x if 
both options were available.
3
 The preference relation R is required to satisfy three 
conditions.
4
 Firstly, R should be a complete and transitive binary relation, i.e. a 
weak ordering; secondly, R should satisfy a technical condition called continuity; 
and thirdly, R should satisfy the famous independence axiom, which says, in effect 
that the agent’s preference between x and y should not depend on which other 
alternatives they are ‘mixed’ with.5 The second condition is needed to make the 
maths work; the first and third may be argued to be constraints that any rational 
agent’s preference relation should satisfy. How compelling these constraints are is 
a much-debated question that we need not enter into for now. 
 From this starting point, von Neumann & Morgenstern then prove their 
celebrated expected utility theorem. This theorem says that if and only if an 
agent’s preference relation R satisfies the three conditions above, then there exists 
a real-valued utility function on O, such that the agent evaluates lotteries in L in 
accordance with the expectation of that utility function, and always prefers the 
lottery with the highest expected utility. The utility function is unique up to 
positive linear transformation. Thus so long as an agent’s preference relation obeys 
the three conditions, then she is behaving as if she assigned numerical utilities to 
the prizes and was consciously computing expected utility.  
 
2.2 Savage’s theory 
The von Neumann & Morgenstern theory has limited scope, since it deals only 
with decision making under risk, i.e. where the objective chances of the outcomes 
                                                          
3
 The idea that preference can be reduced to hypothetical choice in this way is a key tenet of 
‘revealed preference theory’ (cf. Sen 1971); see section 2 below. 
4
 Here I follow the simplification of the von Neumann / Morgenstern axioms originally devised by 
J. Marschak (1950) and standardly found in modern textbooks. 
5
 Formally, the independence condition says that for any lotteries x, y, z and any probability p > 0, 
xRy iff (x, p; z, 1-p) R (y, p; z, 1-p), where ‘(x, p; z, 1-p)’ is the compound lottery that yields x with 
probability p and z with probability 1-p. 
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is known. Gamblers in casinos face decision problems of this sort, but most real 
decisions are done in the face of uncertainty rather than risk, i.e. where objectives 
chances are not known. Both Ramsey (1931) and Savage (1954) devised versions 
of expected utility theory to cover such decisions; here I focus on Savage’s 
version. 
 The primitives of Savage’s theory are a set O of outcomes and a set S of 
possible states of the world, used to represent the agent’s uncertainty. Thus for 
example S might be {rainy, sunny, cloudy} and O might be {£10, £5, £0}.
6
 An 
agent is faced with a choice between acts, where an act is any function from S to 
O. Thus for example one act is (£5 if rainy, £5 if sunny, £0 if cloudy), while 
another is (£10 if rainy, £0 if sunny or cloudy). Intuitively, the agent’s preference 
between these two acts will depend partly on their utility function for money, and 
partly on their subjective beliefs about which state of the world is most likely to 
occur. The set of all acts, i.e. functions from S to O, is denoted A. 
The agent has a preference relation R on the set A, on which Savage 
imposes a number of axioms. Thus for example one axiom requires that R be 
complete and transitive, while another requires that R satisfy the famous ‘sure 
thing’ principle (the analogue of the von Neumann & Morgenstern independence 
postulate). Again, there is considerable debate about whether these axioms are 
indeed rationally compelling. 
 Savage then proves that if and only if the agent’s preference relation 
satisfies his axioms, then there exists a unique probability distribution over S, and 
a utility function over O unique up to positive linear transformation, such that the 
agent’s preference between any two acts is always for the one with the highest 
expected utility. Therefore the agent behaves as if they have probabilistic beliefs 
about the states of the world and a utility function over the outcomes, modulo 
which they choose the act that maximizes expected utility. So Savage succeeds in 
extracting both utilities and (subjective) probabilities from the agent’s preferences.  
 
2.3 Significance of the modern expected utility theories 
                                                          
6
 For technical reasons, Savage’s own construction requires that the set S be at least countably 
infinite, but the essence of his theory can be illustrated with finite S. Wakker (2010) proves a 
version of Savage’s result for finite S (theorem 4.6.4 on p. 112). 
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The significance of the Savage and von Neumann & Morgenstern results is that the 
input to the theorems – the agent’s preference ordering – is in principle amenable 
to observation and introspection. A suitably-placed observer, in favourable 
conditions, could in principle infer from observing an agent’s choice behaviour 
whether they prefer lottery x to y, or act a to b. And the agent themselves, by 
careful introspection, could presumably infer their (hypothetical) preference 
between any two lotteries or acts. Such inferences are fallible, for both observer 
and agent; but even so, the situation is clearly quite different from a theory such as 
Bernoulli’s which posits a real-valued utility function, measurable on a cardinal 
scale, straight off.  
 This means that Savage and von Neumann & Morgenstern are able to 
answer the two questions that Bernoulli’s early theory prompted. The first question 
was how to justify the principle of EU maximization. Bernoulli had no real answer 
to this question, but Savage and von Neumann & Morgenstern do, for in their 
theories the principle is not taken as primitive, but deduced from what are arguably 
more primitive rationality constraints. They show that if an agent cannot be 
represented as an EU maximizer, then their preferences must violate at least one of 
the axioms. Presuming the axioms are accepted, this provides a normative basis, of 
a sort, for EU maximization.  
 This contrast can be sharpened by considering the question: why should an 
agent not care about the variance of the utilities associated with a given lottery or 
act, in addition to the expectation? On a theory such as Bernoulli’s this question is 
a pressing one. But for von Neumann & Morgenstern and Savage, the question 
simply does not arise. So long as the agent’s preference between lotteries / acts 
satisfies the relevant axioms, then there exists a utility function such that the agent 
necessarily behaves as if they are trying to maximize its expectation. That an agent 
should care only about an act’s expected utility, and not about its variance in 
utility, is thus built into the construction of the utility function, on the modern 
view. 
 The second question facing Bernoulli’s theory was: what licenses the 
assumption that utility can be quantified on a cardinal scale? If utility is primitive, 
then treating it as real-valued and cardinally measurable is to make a substantive 
psychological assumption that needs justification. Perhaps some such justification 
could be given; but von Neumann & Morgenstern and Savage bypass this problem 
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altogether, for they prove the existence of a real-valued cardinal utility function 
from the preference axioms. So the device of beginning with preferences over 
risky / uncertain options and ‘reverse engineering’ an agent’s utility function 
permits a neat answer to the challenge to justify the assumption of cardinally 
measurable utility.  
 
3. MENTALISTIC VERSUS BEHAVIOURISTIC INTERPRETATIONS OF EU 
THEORY 
The difference between Bernoulli’s and von Neumann & Morgenstern’s and 
Savage’s theories illustrates the contrast between mentalistic and behaviouristic 
interpretations of EU theory. On the mentalistic interpretation, the utility that an 
outcome has for an agent is regarded as a psychological fact about that agent. 
Various accounts might be given of what sort of fact this is. For example, one 
might think of utility in hedonic terms á la Bentham, or alternatively as a measure 
of subjective or objective well-being (cf. Broome 1991); and one might affirm, or 
deny, that an agent’s utility is always accessible to introspection. The key point is 
that on this view, facts about an agent’s utility function are not reducible to, or 
logical constructions out of, or re-descriptions of, facts about their preferences or 
choices. Rather they are self-standing psychological facts. The mentalistic 
interpretation of EU theory combines this notion of utility with the principle of EU 
maximization.  
 On the behaviourist view, utility is simply a convenient mathematical 
device, introduced by the theorist, for re-describing an agent’s preferences. No 
psychological reality attaches to talk of utility, and utility maximization is strictly 
an ‘as if’ story. So to say that an agent has a particular utility function over a set of 
outcomes is simply a way of summarizing their preference ordering over those 
outcomes. In economists’ jargon, utility is simply a representation of preference. 
This ‘representationalist’ thesis about the relation between utility and preference is 
orthodox among neo-classical economists, and applies more generally than to 
preferences over acts or lotteries. The behaviourist interpretation of EU theory 
combines this representationalist notion of utility with the principle of EU 
maximization.  
 A further behaviourist idea is that preference itself is reducible to 
(hypothetical) choice, i.e. an agent’s preference ordering over a set of alternatives 
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is a summary of her binary choices between them. Thus an observer could literally 
deduce an agent’s preference ordering from observations of her choices. This idea, 
which forms part of ‘revealed preference theory’, is often found in the company of 
what I am calling the behaviourist interpretation of EU theory, but is logically 
distinct from it. To see this, note that someone who rejects revealed preference 
theory, e.g. who holds that preferring a to b is a sui generis mental state that causes 
an agent to choose a over b (so is not reducible to the latter), could still hold that 
the agent’s utility function is a mere representation of their preferences.7 Thus 
there are two issues: the relation between utility and preference, and the relation 
between preference and choice. Our concern here is with the former issue. Thus 
mentalism and behaviourism, in this essay, denote alternative positions about the 
relation between utility and preference, which are compatible with different views 
about how preference relates to choice. The label ‘behaviourist’ is appropriate 
since on any view, an agent’s preference ordering is ‘closer’ to her observable 
behaviour than is a real-valued utility function. 
To sharpen the mentalist / behaviourist contrast, consider the question of 
whether EU theory can explain why an agent prefers a to b by saying that the 
expected utility of a exceeds that of b. On the behaviourist interpretation the 
answer is ‘no’, presuming that explain means causally explain. For a behaviourist, 
the claim that EU(a) > EU(b) is equivalent to a statement about the agent’s 
preferences; specifically, it means that the agent’s preference ordering over the 
outcome set O of which a and b are members can be represented by the expected 
value of a (utility function, credence function) pair, modulo which EU(a) > EU(b).  
In other words, what makes it the case that EU(a) > EU(b) is that the agent 
exhibits a particular pattern of preferences. This obviously precludes the fact that 
EU(a) > EU(b) from constituting a causal explanation of any of those preferences. 
If utility is construed mentalistically, by contrast, then this is a potentially valid 
causal explanation. 
It is perhaps unsurprising that most philosophers have favoured the 
mentalistic interpretation of EU theory. For the opposition between behaviourist 
and mentalist interpretations looks like an instance of the more general clash 
between behaviourism and mentalism in psychology, where it is widely held that 
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 Here I am indebted to Richard Bradley. 
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behaviourism has been refuted. Moreover, many philosophers have wanted to view 
EU theory as a formalization of ordinary folk psychology, with utility and 
credence being the quantitative counterparts of desire and belief respectively, and 
the principle of maximizing expected utility corresponding to the Humean ‘belief-
desire’ law.8 Thus for example David Lewis regards EU theory as “....the very 
essence of our common sense theory of persons, elegantly distilled and 
systematized” (1974: 337). Lewis’s idea really only makes sense on a mentalistic 
interpretation. For it is a standard view, among philosophers and the folk 
themselves, that desires and beliefs do cause actions, and that citing an agent’s 
desires and beliefs does serve to causally explain their behaviour. If decision 
theory is to be regarded as a formalization of folk psychology, which is an 
undeniably attractive idea, the behaviourist interpretation cannot be sustained. 
However the founders of modern EU theory were adamant that their theory 
was to be interpreted behaviouristically.
9
 One clear statement of this is by 
Friedman and Savage (1948) who wrote that the von Neumann & Morgenstern 
expected utility hypothesis  
“asserts that individuals behave as if they calculated and compared  
expected utility and as if they knew the odds...the validity of this assertion  
does not depend on whether individuals know the precise odds, much less  
on whether they say that they calculate and compare expected utilities or  
think that they do, or whether psychologists can uncover any evidence that  
they do, but solely on whether it yields sufficiently accurate predictions  
about the class of decisions with which the hypothesis deals” (1948: 282).  
 
In a similar vein, J. Harsanyi (1977) wrote, in relation to Savage’s theory: 
“a Bayesian need not have a special desire to maximize expected utility per 
se. Rather, he simply wants to act in accordance with a few very important 
rationality axioms, and he knows that this fact has the inevitable 
mathematical implication of making his behaviour equivalent to expected-
utility maximization. As long as he obeys these rationality axioms, he 
                                                          
8
 Hampton (1994) provides some telling criticisms of this supposed connection between EU theory 
and belief-desire psychology. 
 
9
 A possible exception is Frank Ramsey (1931), whose views on the behaviourism versus 
mentalism issue are not easy to discern. See Bradley (2004) for an insightful discussion Ramsey’s 
position. 
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simply cannot help acting as if he assigned numerical utilities...to 
alternative possible outcomes of his behaviour, and assigned numerical 
probabilities...to alternative contingencies that may arise, and as if he tried 
to maximize his expected utility in terms of these utilities and probabilities” 
(1977: 381).  
 
Here Harsanyi explicitly endorses the behaviourist claim that to describe an 
individual as maximizing EU is simply to say that their preferences satisfy certain 
axioms. 
Another facet of the behaviourist interpretation is the insistence that an agent’s 
utility function, as defined by the EU theorems, has nothing to do with the cardinal 
utility of the 19
th
 century economists. The latter held, with Bentham, that ‘utility’ 
was a measure of the pleasure or happiness that an agent gets from a good, with the 
cardinality deriving from the assumption that the intensity of pleasure can be 
quantified. On this traditional view, cardinal utility had nothing in particular to do 
with risk or uncertainty, and was supposed to apply to choices between certain 
outcomes. However both Savage and Arrow claimed that in EU theory, the ‘utility’ 
of an outcome must not be identified with the amount of happiness an agent would 
get from its certain receipt. Thus Arrow (1951: 425) wrote that utility conceived of 
in this way was “a meaningless concept”, while Savage (1954: 93) cautioned 
against confusing his notion of utility with “the now almost obsolete notion of 
utility in riskless circumstances.” 
In their influential Games and Decisions (1957: 32), R. Luce and H. Raiffa 
discuss a number of common ‘fallacies’ about EU theory. The first fallacy is that 
an agent prefers lottery x to lottery y because EU(x) > EU(y). This “is the exact 
opposite of the truth”, they argue. The second is that a rational agent might care 
about the variance of utilities, as well as the expectation. This is a “completely 
wrong interpretation of the utility notion”, they claim. Luce and Raiffa argue that 
both of these fallacies stem from “a failure to accept that preferences precede 
utilities”. They insist that EU theory should not be treated as a theory about what is 
going on in the heads of rational decision makers: “there is no need to assume, or 
to philosophize about, the existence of an underlying subjective utility function, for 
we are not attempting to account for the preferences or the rules of consistency. 
We only wish to devise a convenient way to represent them”. 
12 
 
The behaviourist interpretation of EU theory is still pervasive among 
contemporary economists, and routinely taught as part of microeconomic 
orthodoxy.
10
 Indicative of this is the textbook treatment of risk aversion. Empirical 
work shows that that people’s preferences over monetary gambles are generally 
risk averse, i.e. they prefer to receive $x for certain to a gamble with expected 
monetary value of $x. One might think that EU theory can explain this fact, by 
hypothesizing, with Bernoulli, that agents’ utility functions for money are concave. 
However this is only a legitimate explanation on a mentalistic interpretation of EU 
theory. Economics textbooks, by contrast, simply define risk-aversion as concave 
utility – the standard ‘coefficient of risk aversion’ is simply a measure of the 
concavity of an agent’s utility function for money.11 So there is no question of 
concave utility explaining risk-averse preferences; they are simply one and the 
same thing, on the textbook view. 
Given that the founders of EU theory insisted on the behaviouristic 
interpretation, it is striking that contemporary philosophers almost always adopt 
the mentalistic interpretation. Thus for example D.H. Mellor (2005: 140), in a 
discussion of ‘subjective decision theory’ (SDT), writes: “actions of whose 
aetiology SDT is true are not only thereby causally explained by the subjective 
credences and utilities which cause them; those actions are also thereby 
rationalized, since credences and utilities which cause actions as SDT says are 
reasons for acting in a quite standard sense”. In describing the credences and 
utilities of Bayesian decision theory as ‘causes’, Mellor takes himself to be stating 
an obvious and widely-held view; yet this view was explicitly rejected by the 
originators of Bayesian decision theory, as we have seen.  
The prevalence of the mentalistic interpretation in the philosophical 
literature is manifest in how decision theory is often presented. The typical 
philosopher’s presentation begins with a utility and a credence function, often in 
the form of a 2 x 2 matrix, then explains that decision theory proscribes the rule of 
maximizing expected utility. Often there is little discussion of what the utility 
                                                          
10
 See for example Gilboa (2009), or Mas-Collel, Whinston and Green (1995) which defend the 
behaviourist view and take it for granted, respectively. See also the section devoted to the ‘causal 
utility fallacy’ in Binmore (2008: 19--22).  
11
 This coefficient, known as the ‘Arrow-Pratt’ coefficient of risk aversion, is defined as u(x) / 
u(x) where ‘x’ is money,  i.e. the second derivative of the utility function divided by the first. Since 
u(x) is always positive – the agent prefers more money to less – the sign of the coefficient of risk 
aversion is given by the sign of u(x). 
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numbers mean, or where they came from, and in particular no mention of the idea 
that they are derived from preferences via a representation theorem. This is true of 
Nozick’s (1967) paper on Newcomb’s problem and much of the ensuing literature 
on that topic. For example D. Lewis (1981) introduces what he takes to be standard 
decision theory as follows: “a rational agent has at any moment a credence 
function and a value function....each world W has a value V(W), which measures 
how satisfactory it seems to the agent for W to be the actual world....decision 
theory...prescribes the rule of V-maximizing, according to which a rational choice 
is one that has greatest expected value” (1981: 6). Lewis makes no mention of 
preferences at all; he appears to conceive the agent’s ‘value function’ (i.e. utility 
function) mentalistically. However he says nothing about what why it should be 
supposed cardinally measurable, nor why rationality prescribes maximization of its 
expectation. 
 This observation is not necessarily a criticism of those philosophical 
discussions to which it applies. For some purposes, it may not matter whether 
utility is treated as psychologically real or as a representation of preference; it 
seems likely, for example, that the ‘causal versus evidential’ issue that is the focus 
of much philosophical interest will arise anyway. Moreover, it may be 
pedagogically useful to introduce the principle of EU maximization by simply 
positing probabilities and utilities ab initio, as for example R. Jeffrey does in the 
first chapter of The Logic of Decision (1990), whatever one’s view of the 
behaviourist versus mentalism issue. And finally, it may be that there are sound 
arguments against the behaviourist interpretation anyway; so that in presenting EU 
theory in mentalistic guise, philosophers are taking themselves to be offering a 
more methodologically acceptable version of that theory, free from unnecessary 
behaviouristic shackles. 
 This last suggestion raises two important questions. Firstly, do the standard 
anti-behaviourist considerations in psychology and philosophy of mind, which 
most contemporary philosophers accept, tell against the behaviourist interpretation 
of EU theory? Secondly, if so, can we simply adopt EU theory but divest it of the 
behaviouristic interpretation that its early twentieth century pioneers gave it? A 
number of recent discussions suggest that the answer to both questions is ‘yes’. 
Christensen (2001) and Eriksson & Hajek (2007) both deploy standard anti-
behaviourist arguments against the behaviouristic construal of the credences and 
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utilities that feature in subjective EU theory; while Joyce (1999) advocates 
divesting decision theory of its ‘pragmatist’ (i.e. behaviourist) commitments. 
Bermudez (2009) also offers a qualified endorsement of this view. However I think 
the situation is not quite this simple. The answer to these two questions depends 
crucially on what use we want to put decision theory to. 
 
4. NORMATIVE VERSUS DESCRIPTIVE USES OF EU THEORY 
It is a familiar point that EU theory can either be interpreted normatively or 
descriptively. These options are not exclusive: the same theory may be able to do 
both jobs.
 
The normative / descriptive contrast is muddied slightly by the fact that 
EU theory involves a measure of idealization; those who construe the theory 
descriptively regard it as a useful model of actual choices, not a literally correct 
description. However the contrast is still reasonably sharp: a description, even 
idealized, is different from a prescription. 
 Economists are typically interested in the descriptive construal of EU 
theory; their main concern is to describe and predict actual human behaviour (cf. 
the quote from Friedman and Savage (1948) above.) This is not to say that 
considerations of rationality play no role, but it is derivative. Economists who 
employ rational choice models do so out of a conviction that humans’ economic 
behaviour, at least in some domains, is largely rational; where this can be shown 
not to hold, they develop alternative models. Thus the discovery in the 1970s that 
experimental subjects exhibit preferences that systematically violate EU theory  
led to the rapid development of ‘non-expected utility’ theories, in an attempt to 
improve on EU’s predictive fit to the data. This is a large and ongoing area of 
research (cf. footnote 1).  
Philosophers by contrast are usually interested in EU theory construed  
normatively, i.e. as prescribing how choices should be made. Thus much of the 
philosophical interest has been in hypothetical cases where EU theory appears to 
offer counter-intuitive advice, and what to say about them. Indicative of this 
difference in focus is that the literature on experimental violations of EU theory 
has received little attention from philosophers, and the non-expected utility models 
have hardly been discussed at all.
12
 This is not necessarily a lacuna: if one’s 
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 Exceptions to this generalization include Bermudez (2009), Okasha (2011) and Buchak (2013). 
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concern is with principles of rational choice, one is unlikely to be concerned with 
theories whose stated intent is to describe departures from ideal rationality. 
 How does the normative versus descriptive issue relate to the mentalistic 
versus behaviouristic issue? I argue below that if one is interested in EU theory 
construed descriptively, as are most economists, then either the mentalistic or the 
behaviouristic interpretations is in principle available; but that general anti-
behaviouristic considerations tell in favour of the former. However if one is 
interested in EU theory construed normatively, as are most philosophers, then the 
behaviourist interpretation is in a sense mandatory. If this is correct then there is a 
considerable irony. For most philosophers have favoured the mentalistic 
interpretation of EU theory, but construed the theory normatively. This is the one 
option that is not available, if I am right. 
 
5. BEHAVIOURISM VERSUS MENTALISM ON THE DESCRIPTIVE 
CONSTRUAL 
Consider firstly the descriptive construal of EU theory. For concreteness, let us 
focus on Savage’s version. So construed, the theory says that an agent’s 
preferences over uncertain options, i.e. ‘acts’ in Savage’s sense, do in fact satisfy 
certain axioms; and then proves the existence of a unique credence and utility 
function, modulo which the agent may be represented as maximizing expected 
utility. Now suppose for the sake of argument that this theory was descriptively 
successful, i.e. that people’s actual preferences satisfy the axioms. (Empirically we 
know that this is not so; but leave that aside for the moment.) Let us then ask: 
should we interpret the theory mentalistically or behaviouristically? In particular, 
should an agent’s credence and utility function be treated as fictions, or as 
psychologically real? 
 Though Savage insisted on the behaviouristic interpretation, from a modern 
vantage point this looks untenable. Almost all sciences introduce theoretical posits 
that go beyond, and are meant to explain, the data; few philosophers today are 
tempted by an instrumentalist or fictionalist attitude towards such posits. This is as 
true in psychology as anywhere else; since the ‘first cognitive revolution’, 
psychologists have been happy to posit unobservable mental states and processes, 
many of them inaccessible to consciousness, that are meant to explain behaviour. 
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And in philosophy of mind, it is a commonplace to regard an agent’s intentional 
attitudes, such as beliefs and desires, as internal causes of the agent’s behaviour.  
Against this background, there seems every reason to regard an agent’s  
credence and utility functions, as defined by Savage’s theorem, as psychologically 
real, and as capable of explaining her preferences and choices. For consider the 
question: what explains the fact that our agent’s preferences satisfy the Savage 
axioms? This is a legitimate question, and a pressing one given that the vast 
majority of possible preference orderings over acts do not satisfy those axioms. On 
the mentalistic interpretation, there is potentially a simple answer: the agent has a 
credence function over states of the world, and a utility function over outcomes, 
which she uses to compute the expected utility of the available acts before 
choosing the one with the highest. If the credence and utility functions are viewed 
as psychologically real, this constitutes a potential causal-computational 
explanation of why the agent’s observed preferences satisfy the Savage axioms. 
The computations will presumably be occurring at the sub-personal level, but this 
is quite standard in cognitive psychology. But on the behaviourist interpretation 
this explanation is unavailable; that the agent’s preferences satisfy the Savage 
axioms is left as an unexplained fact. 
Note that this argument is an application of a standard anti-behaviourist 
line of thought, according to which behaviourism, by refusing to posit 
unobservable mental states and processes, is left unable to explain certain salient 
observable regularities. A similar argument is often levelled against 
instrumentalism about unobservable posits in general, not just psychological 
posits. There seems no reason why such arguments should not apply to decision 
theory (construed descriptively). From this perspective, those who insist on the 
behaviouristic interpretation appear to be cleaving to an outdated, positivistic 
philosophy of science; this point is argued in detail by Dietrich and List 
(forthcoming). 
In effect, this is to suggest that standard maxims of scientific inference tell 
in favour of the mentalistic interpretation. Faced with a very specific pattern in our 
data – preferences that satisfy the Savage axioms – we hypothesize the existence of 
entities – credence and utility functions that combine in a particular way – to 
explain the data. This explanation is elegant, and the rule of combination – 
mathematical expectation – is highly intuitive. Of course there is no guarantee that 
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the explanation is correct, but there is strong inductive evidence in favour of it. For 
unless the agent is performing expected utility calculations at the sub-personal 
level, how do we explain the remarkable fact that her preferences exhibit the 
pattern that they do? 
This argument tallies with the fact that in recent years certain 
neuroscientists, notably Paul Glimcher and colleagues, claim to have discovered a 
neural basis for expected utility maximization. Glimcher (1993) claims that 
different neural structures encode an agent’s credence and utility functions, and 
that expected utility computations are actually taking place at the neural level. He 
and his co-authors write:  “the available data suggest that the neural architecture 
actually does compute a desirability for each available course of action. This is real 
physical computation, accomplished by neurons, that derives and encodes a real 
variable” (Glimcher et. al. 2005: 220). In effect, Glimcher is pursuing a version of 
the methodological strategy recommended above: treating EU theory as a 
candidate descriptive theory of how agents actually choose in the face of 
uncertainty, but refusing to countenance the behaviourist interpretation of that 
theory.  
The foregoing argument is complicated slightly, but only slightly, by the 
fact that EU theory is known not to fit the available experimental data as well as 
the non-EU alternatives. For the general point – that there is no more reason to 
regard credences and utilities as fictions than other scientific posits – extrapolates 
easily to non-expected utility models. Take for example the well-known ‘Choquet 
expected utility’ model of Schmeidler (1989), which represents an agent’s 
preferences by means of a utility function over outcomes and a (non-additive) 
belief function over events; the model was designed to accommodate observed 
violations of the EU axioms. In so far as the model provides a good descriptive fit 
to the data, the anti-behaviouristic considerations outlined above apply just as well. 
Standard maxims of scientific inference suggest that we should accept these 
functions as psychologically real, and capable of explaining an agent’s 
preferences. The same applies to other non-EU models too, such as cumulative 
prospect theory, which currently appears to fit the experimental data better than the 
alternatives (cf. Wakker 2010). 
Two possible behaviourist responses to this argument spring to mind. First, 
one might deny that general anti-instrumentalist considerations support a 
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mentalistic construal of the utility and credence functions of decision theory. These 
entities have a specific mathematical structure, and in this respect are different 
from the internal states and processes that cognitive psychology usually traffics in. 
Even if one is happy to posit sub-personal internal states to explain behaviour, one 
might have qualms about positing internal states that satisfy certain specific 
measurability assumptions. The suggestion is thus that there is a particular reason 
for construing utility and credence functions in an ‘as if’ way, that does not apply 
more generally.  
This is a coherent suggestion, but would need considerable elaboration to 
be convincing. It is true that a real-valued utility function, measurable on a cardinal 
scale, is unlike the typical internal state that cognitive psychology posits; but if 
positing such a state is needed to explain the data there can surely be no a priori 
objection. This is an empirical matter. However this suggestion does raise one 
important issue, which is that proponents of the mentalistic interpretation need to 
clarify the relation between credences and utilities, conceived as psychologically 
real, and ordinary beliefs and desires. More generally, what is the relation between 
an agent’s own explanations of their choices in terms of beliefs and desires, and 
the explanations of the EU (or non-EU) theorist in terms of credences and utilities? 
This is a pressing issue for anyone who construes decision theory descriptively and 
adopts the mentalistic interpretation; see section 6 below. 
Secondly, a proponent of the behaviourist interpretation might argue that 
for their purposes, it makes no difference whether utilities and credences are 
psychologically real or not, so there is no need to assume that they are. 
Economists’ primary interest is in choice behaviour and its consequences; the 
psychological causes of that behaviour are sometimes regarded as irrelevant to 
their concerns.
13
 From this perspective, to interpret decision theory mentalistically 
is to append to it a gratuitous piece of metaphysics. An argument of this sort is 
suggested by Friedman and Savage’s insistence that the hypothesis of EU 
maximization can only be falsified by choice data. 
This is a coherent response (though reliant on a controversial conception of 
economic methodology). However at most it shows that for certain intellectual 
                                                          
13
 This traditional view is defended by Gul and Pesendorfer (2010), but opposed by Camerer (2010) 
among others. These and the other papers  in Caplin and Schotter (2010) offer differing perspectives 
on this issue. See Clarke (2014) and Dietrich and List (forthcoming) for useful discussion. 
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purposes the behaviourist interpretation is all that need be assumed. It does not 
show that proponents of the mentalistic interpretation are guilty of a gross 
methodological error, or have violated some canon of reasonable inference. Indeed 
a main lesson of post-positivist philosophy of science is that in practice, theories 
rarely achieve close fit to the observed data unless they have the causal structure of 
the world at least approximately right (cf. Dietrich and List (forthcoming)). There 
seems no reason why this general moral should not apply to theories of decision-
making. 
To sum up, if EU theory is construed descriptively, as a theory about 
peoples’ actual preferences or choices, there seems no particular reason to interpret 
the theory behaviouristically rather than mentalistically, unless one endorses a 
general instrumentalist attitude towards science that few contemporary 
philosophers find plausible. On the contrary, to the extent that the theory fits the 
data, there seems good reason to adopt a realistic attitude to the utilities and 
credences which the theory posits. The same applies to the ‘non-EU theories’ that 
attempt to model departures of actual behaviour from the predictions of EU.  
 
6. BEHAVIOURISM VERSUS METNTALISM ON THE NORMATIVE 
CONSTRUAL 
Construed normatively, EU theory is a theory of rational rather than actual 
behaviour; again, I focus on Savage’s version for concreteness. So construed, the 
theory claims that on pain of irrationality, an agent’s choices between acts should 
satisfy certain axioms, modulo which she is representable as an expected utility 
maximizer. I claim that, in an important sense, the behaviourist interpretation is 
actually mandatory when the theory is construed normatively. 
 The key point is a simple one. The fundamental normative requirement of 
EU theory is a constraint on an agent’s preferences – that they should conform to 
the Savage axioms – and not on the agent’s credences, utilities, or rule for 
combining them into a choice criterion. As we know, it follows from Savage’s 
theorem that if an agent’s preferences satisfy this constraint, then she behaves as if 
maximizing the expected value of a utility function on the outcomes with respect 
to a credence function on the states of nature. But it is quite wrong to view the 
normative content of the theory as saying that an agent should maximize expected 
utility relative to a psychologically real utility and credence function. For that 
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normative requirement, even if we grant that it makes sense, is logically stronger 
than the requirement that the agent’s preferences satisfy the axioms, and is no part 
of EU theory correctly understood. 
To see this point, suppose we have some grounds for attributing to an agent 
a ‘psychological’ utility function, real-valued and cardinally measurable, over a set 
of outcomes. (For example, perhaps the agent can introspect this utility function.) 
Suppose we also have grounds for attributing to the agent a credence function over 
a set of states of nature that satisfies the laws of probability, again interpreted 
psychologically. Now consider the normative injunction: ‘choose between acts so 
as to maximize expected utility, relative to your psychological utility and credence 
function’. If the agent follows this injunction, then her resulting preference relation 
over acts will satisfy Savage’s axioms. But the converse is not the case. Even if the 
agent violates this injunction, it is perfectly possible that her preference relation 
satisfies Savage’s axioms. If so, then one of two things must be true. Either her 
Savage utility function, as defined by the EU representation theorem, is non-linear 
with respect to her ‘psychological’ utility function; or her Savage credence 
function is not identical to her psychological credence function, or both. In either 
case, her preferences are perfectly rational (in the sense of conforming to the 
Savage axioms). 
The point can equivalently be put as follows. An agent whose preference 
relation satisfies the Savage axioms can be represented as if maximizing the 
expected value of a utility function with respect to a unique credence function. But 
there is no guarantee that the utility and credence functions of which this is true 
bear any particular relation to the agent’s psychological ‘utility’ and ‘credence’ 
functions, if such things exist.
14
 So it is quite wrong to construe EU theory as 
telling an agent to maximize expected utility with respect to some pre-existing 
‘credence’ and ‘utility’ functions, that are defined independently of their choice 
behaviour. Even if such functions exist, and are measurable on the appropriate 
scales, maximizing expected utility with respect to them is not necessary for 
having preferences that satisfy the Savage axioms, which is the fundamental 
normative requirement. 
                                                          
14
 This point was made by Harsanyi (1977: 286), who wrote that “introspective utility functions 
need not have any simple relationship to the utility functions inferred from people’s behaviour”. 
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It follows that if EU theory is construed normatively rather than 
descriptively, the behaviourist interpretation cannot simply be ditched. Suppose 
that, motivated by standard anti-behaviourist considerations, we interpret the utility 
concept psychologically, e.g. in hedonic terms à la Bentham. Suppose we then 
interpret EU theory to say that an agent should maximize the expected value of this 
hedonic utility function, with respect to their subjective beliefs (credences). Then, 
we immediately run into the two problems that Bernoulli’s theory faced: to justify 
the assumption that this hedonic utility function is cardinally measurable, and to 
explain why a rational agent should care only about the expected utility of an act – 
rather than also attending to the variance in utility, for example. The first problem 
could conceivably be solved, but the second is intractable.  
To see why, consider an agent who is simply risk-averse with respect to 
hedonic utility – they strictly prefer to receive 5 hedonic utils for sure to a fair coin 
flip on 10 hedonic utils or nothing. Intuitively this is perfectly rational, just as it is 
perfectly rational to strictly prefer 5 dollars for sure to a fair coin flip on 10 dollars 
or nothing (cf. Buchak 2013). And to repeat, it is perfectly possible that such an 
agent exhibit preferences that satisfy the Savage axioms, in which case her utility 
function defined à la Savage will simply be concave with respect to her hedonic 
utility function. So the normative injunction to maximize expected ‘hedonic’ utility 
is both intuitively unreasonably, in that it seems perfectly sensible to be risk-averse 
with respect to it, and unsupported by any axiomatic argument.  
Note that this argument applies not just to hedonic utility but to any 
‘psychological’ notion of utility at all, for all such notions, however exactly they 
are defined, cannot be guaranteed to coincide with the utility that comes from the 
EU representation theorems. So the injunction to maximize the expected value of a 
psychological utility function is necessarily more demanding than the requirement 
to have preferences that accord with the Savage axioms. Moreover, without further 
explanation of how ‘psychological’ utility relates to preference or choice, it is 
unclear how one would ever be able to tell whether an agent was obeying the 
injunction or not. 
This explains why I say that if EU theory is taken normatively, the 
behaviourist interpretation is mandatory. If one adopts the mentalistic 
interpretation, i.e. posits utility and credence functions that are defined 
independently of preference or choice, and then interprets the theory as enjoining 
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an agent to maximize expected utility with respect to these functions, this in effect 
takes us ‘back to Bernoulli’. It sacrifices the crucial conceptual advance of the von 
Neumann and Morgenstern and Savage theories: supplying a normative 
justification for the principle of maximizing expected utility. This justification is 
only available if one adopts the behaviourist interpretation. 
It follows that standard anti-behaviourist considerations in the philosophy 
of mind gain no traction if our interest is in normative decision theory. The 
fundamental norm of modern decision theory is a requirement on preference (or 
choice, on a revealed preference view). Of course one might accept this norm, but 
also hold, in an anti-behaviouristic spirit, that agents have psychologically real 
credence and utility functions that explain their preferences or choices; and one 
might further hold that these credence functions are (or should be) probabilistic. 
There is nothing wrong with such a combination of views. But crucially, one must 
not then read EU theory as prescribing maximization of expected utility with 
respect to these credence and utility functions. This is a more stringent requirement 
than that preferences should accord with the Savage axioms, and one that modern 
decision theory, correctly understood, does not recognize. 
To summarize: if credence and utility are taken as psychologically real, and 
defined independently of preference or choice, the normativity of the ‘maximize 
EU principle’ receives no support from the Savage axioms. Of course, there might 
be some other argument, not based on axiomatic conditions on preferences, for 
why an agent is rationally required to maximize EU with respect to her 
‘psychological’ utility and credence functions. For example, an argument might be 
made that an agent who does not do this is almost certain in the long-run to end up 
with less psychological utility than one who does, or will end up committing to 
choices that her future self would regret, or will be guilty of some other sort of 
incoherence or mental instability. Such arguments are conceivable, but to my 
knowledge none has been spelled out in the literature. Were such an argument to 
succeed, it would be quite different to the argument for EU maximization based on 
the Savage axioms, as it would involve a different utility concept. 
This implies that if one is interested in decision theory construed 
normatively, as are most philosophers, then one cannot simply eschew the 
behaviourist interpretation and hold onto the rest of theory intact. And yet this is 
precisely what many modern philosophers do, i.e. they start their discussion with 
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utility and credence functions, understood psychologically and defined 
independently of preference or choice, and then interpret decision theory as issuing 
the normative injunction to maximize expected utility with respect to them. But 
this is to fundamentally misconstrue the normative content of modern EU theory. I 
turn now to a critique of recent philosophical work which is guilty of this error. 
 
7. CRITIQUE OF SOME PHILOSOPHICAL WORK  
The view I am critiquing is too widespread to document exhaustively. Much of the 
literature on ‘causal decision theory’, from Nozick (1967) and Lewis (1981) 
onwards, proceeds by simply writing down credence and utility functions, with no 
mention of the idea of deriving them from preferences via a representation theorem 
(though Joyce (1999) is a notable exception). These credences and utility functions 
are generally assumed to be psychologically real, or at least to be legitimate 
idealizations of real psychological states, and to be capable to causally explaining 
an action’s choices. Sometimes this is stated explicitly, as for example in Mellor 
(2005) quoted above. 
 Presenting decision theory this way is unexceptionable if the aim is 
descriptive but the discussions in question have a normative focus. (If the aim were 
descriptive it would odd to focus exclusively on EU theory.) Typically, authors 
appear to interpret decision theory as issuing the normative injunction to maximize 
EU with respect to these psychological credence and utility functions. But even if 
we grant that this advice is meaningful, i.e. grant that such psychologically real 
functions exist and are measurable on appropriate scales, this is a stronger 
requirement than the true normative injunction of modern EU theory. 
 Two recent papers that illustrate this are Briggs (2010) and Meacham and 
Weisberg (2011).
15
 Briggs writes: “it is a platitude among decision theorists that 
agents should choose their actions so as to maximize expected value...I make 
absolutely no substantial assumptions about the nature of the good measured by 
the value function: ‘value’ may be read hedonically, morally, aesthetically, 
pragmatically, or in whatever other way suits the reader’s fancy” (2010: 2). 
However, the only notion of ‘value’ (i.e. utility) of which it is a ‘platitude’ that 
agents should maximize its expectation is utility in the sense of von 
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 I stress that both papers have considerable merit, and in the case of Briggs, the point I am 
critiquing is incidental to the main arguments of her paper.  
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Neumann/Morgenstern and Savage, i.e. the utility function defined by the 
representation theorems. If ‘value’ is read as moral value, or aesthetic value, it is 
emphatically not a platitude that a rational agent should try to maximize expected 
value. On the contrary, risk aversion with respect to these ‘values’ is perfectly 
rational, and is compatible with having preferences that satisfy the EU axioms. It is 
evident that Briggs construes decision theory as telling the agent to maximize 
expected utility with respect to some independently defined utility function; which 
as I have argued is a misconception. 
 The same is true of Weisberg and Meacham’s paper, which is entitled ‘Can 
representation theorems provide a foundation for decision theory?’ They take 
‘decision theory’ to mean the normative injunction to maximize expected utility 
with respect to psychological credence and utility functions. Quite reasonably, they 
then wonder what the basis for this normative injunction could be; they then 
consider and reject the suggestion that ‘representation theorems’ supply the 
answer. But this is to get things backwards. As I have stressed, the true normative 
injunction of EU theory is ‘choose in accordance with certain axioms’; this is 
equivalent to maximizing expected utility with respect to the credence and utility 
functions defined by the EU representation theorem. So there is no question of this 
normative injunction receiving a ‘foundation’ in something more basic. It is only if 
one misconstrues EU theory in the way I have described that one might be tempted 
to ask this question. 
 Another case worth discussing is Joyce (1999), one of the most 
sophisticated philosophical works on decision theory. Joyce cannot fairly be 
accused of the misconstrual I have criticized in other authors, but there is a 
dialectical tension in his position which is related. Joyce’s position is interesting 
because his concern is with normative issues, and he endorses the methodology of 
seeking representation theorems for EU maximization; but he also argues strongly 
that “decision theory must throw off the pragmatist / behaviourist straitjacket that 
has hindered its progress for the past seventy years” (1999: 254). This combination 
of views is striking because the ‘representationalist’ approach to decision theory is 
intimately bound up with behaviourism. Indeed unless one is a behaviourist, it is 
hard to see why the orthodox methodology of deriving EU maximization from 
axioms on preferences would have much appeal. This prompts the question: given 
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his rejection of behaviourism, what function does Joyce think that a representation 
theorem actually serves?  
 Joyce explicitly addresses this question. He argues that an EU 
representation theorem achieves two things: firstly to “help us understand what the 
global mandate to maximize expected utility demands at the level of individual 
preferences”; and secondly to “make it possible for proponents of expected utility 
maximization to rest their case on the plausibility of the local axioms rather than 
the expected utility principle itself” (1999: 82). (These correspond to the right-to-
left and left-to-right directions of Savage’s theorem respectively.) However the 
second of these achievements only makes sense on a behaviouristic view. For the 
‘plausibility of the axioms’ only supplies a justification for expected utility 
maximization if by an agent’s ‘utility function’ we mean the function that we get 
out of the representation theorem. On a mentalistic view of utility, the injunction to 
maximize expected utility is strictly stronger than the injunction to have 
preferences that obey the Savage axioms; so proponents of expected utility who 
favour a mentalistic interpretation cannot “rest their case on the plausibility of the 
local axioms”, as Joyce suggests. 
 What about the first of the two achievements that Joyce credits to the EU 
representation theorem? This applies equally on a mentalistic or a behaviouristic 
view. On either, it is quite true that a representation theorem shows us what the 
requirement to maximize expected utility implies for an agent’s preference 
relation. This in turn teaches us how we could conclusively show that an agent is 
failing to maximize expected utility – by showing that their preferences don’t 
satisfy the axioms. This applies for any notion of utility, mentalistic or otherwise. 
But what achieves this is the mathematically trivial, right-to-left part of the 
representation theorem – which says that if an agent has a utility function and a 
probability function relative to which they maximize expected utility, then their 
resulting preferences will satisfy the axioms. The real interest in a representation 
theorem is the converse result that satisfying the axioms is sufficient for the agent 
to be representable as an EU maximizer, which is non-trivial.
16
  
This suggests that Joyce’s attempt to reconcile the ‘representationalist’ 
methodology of modern decision theory with his rejection of behaviourism does 
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 This point is made neatly by Dekel and Lipman (2010), who argue that some of the rationales 
often given for seeking representation theorems only require the trivial half of the theorem. 
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not succeed. The second of the two achievements that he credits to a representation 
theorem only makes sense on a behaviouristic view; while the first provides no 
reason to find axioms on preferences that suffice for, in addition to being required 
by, EU maximization. But the search for such axioms is at the heart of most 
modern decision-theoretic work, include Joyce’s own. 
Finally, I want to speculate on why so many philosophers have interpreted 
EU theory in the way I have criticized, i.e. as prescribing maximization of 
expected utility relative to ‘psychological’ utility and probability functions. Part of 
the answer, I suspect, is the tendency to regard decision theory as a formalization 
of belief-desire psychology, and the maximize EU principle as the quantitative 
counterpart of the Humean belief-desire law. Typical formulations of the latter 
read “if an agent desires x, and believes that doing y is the best way of bringing 
about x, then they will do y, ceteris paribus”. Intuitively this ‘law’ has some 
connection with decision theory, given that credences and utilities are naturally 
regarded as ‘graded’ beliefs and desires. If one thinks that the belief-desire law has 
normative appeal, and if one interprets beliefs and desires non-behaviouristically, 
as most philosophers do, and if also one thinks that the maximize EU principle is 
the natural formalization of the belief-desire law, then one will be led to interpret 
EU theory in the way criticized above. 
However it is far from obvious that the EU principle is the uniquely correct 
formalization of the belief-desire law. To see this, consider an agent whose 
preferences violate the Savage axioms, and so who cannot be represented as 
maximizing EU on any notion of utility, mentalistic or otherwise. For 
concreteness, suppose that the agent has the well-known Allais preferences, so 
violates Savage’s sure-thing principle, but satisfies the axioms of rank-dependent 
utility theory.
17
 Does it really follow that such an agent is in breach of something 
like the Humean belief-desire law, i.e. that they are failing to choose the action 
that, by their own lights, will bring them the outcome they most want? It is not all 
clear that this is so.
18
 At the very least, the point would need careful 
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 Rank-dependent utility theory was devised by Quiggin (1982) and Schmeidler (1989), for risk and 
uncertainty respectively (though under different names). See Wakker (2010) for good discussion. 
 
18
 Here I am indebted to Christopher Clarke (2012) who argues persuasively that the true decision-
theoretic analogue of the Humean belief-desire law is not the EU principle but rather the weaker 
principle of stochastic dominance, which says that if prospect x ‘stochastically dominates’ prospect 
27 
 
argumentation, and some way of explicitly translating the language of beliefs and 
desires into that of credences and utilities. The loose conceptual connection 
between belief-desire psychology and decision theory is quite inadequate, on its 
own, to warrant treating the EU principle as a norm that applies relative to 
antecedently given probability and utility functions in the manner criticized above. 
 
8. CONCLUSION 
The pioneers of 20
th
 century decision theory were adamant in their insistence on 
the behaviouristic interpretation of their theory, an attitude that is still prevalent 
among contemporary economists. However among many philosophers, the usual 
interpretation of decision theory is mentalistic, closer in many ways to the original 
theory of Bernoulli. I have argued that the correct interpretation depends on 
whether we want to use decision theory for descriptive or normative ends. 
Construed descriptively, as a theory of actual choice, there seems no reason not to 
interpret credence and utility as psychologically real, at least to the extent that the 
theory fits the data. But construed normatively, as a theory of ideally rational 
choice, matters are different. For the fundamental normative requirement in EU 
theory is on preferences; if one attempts to marry a mentalistic construal of utility 
and credence with the maximize EU norm, one produces a normative injunction 
that is strictly stronger than the requirement that preferences should conform to the 
theory’s axioms, and that there is no particular reason to obey. This crucial point 
appears to have gone unnoticed in much of the literature. 
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y, then the agent should prefer. Informally, this means that for any utility level, the probability of 
getting an outcome with at least that utility level is greater if one chooses x rather than y. 
Importantly, while the principle of stochastic dominance is satisfied by EU theory, it is also satisfied 
by most extant alternatives to EU theory, including rank-dependent utility theory and cumulative 
prospect theory. See Wakker (2010) for useful discussion. 
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